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In with the Big, Out with the Small:  
Removing  Small-Scale Reservations in India†
By Leslie A. Martin, Shanthi Nataraj, and Ann E. Harrison*
An ongoing debate in employment policy is whether promoting 
small and medium enterprises creates jobs. We use the elimination 
of  small-scale industry (SSI) promotion in India to address 
this question. For 60 years, SSI promotion in India focused on 
reserving certain products for manufacture by small and medium 
enterprises. We identify the consequences for employment growth, 
investment, output, productivity, and wages of dismantling India’s 
SSI reservations. We exploit variation in the timing of  de-reservation 
across products and also measure the  long-run impact of national 
SSI policy changes using variation in  pretreatment exposure at the 
district level. Districts more exposed to  de-reservation experienced 
higher employment and output growth. Entrants into the  de-reserved 
product spaces and incumbents that were previously constrained by 
the size restrictions drove the increase in growth. The results suggest 
that dismantling India’s SSI policies encouraged overall employment 
growth. (JEL E24, L25, L53, L60, O14, O25)
Most governments promote small and medium enterprises (SME). Why? The 
US Trade Representative’s office suggests that “America’s small businesses are the 
backbone of the US economy.”1 The United States Small Business Jobs Act, signed 
into law in 2010, provides a range of credit opportunities and tax cuts to promote 
small and medium enterprises. In Europe, the 2008 Small Business Act for Europe 
seeks to reduce regulatory burdens for small businesses, provides tax incentives 
1 https://ustr.gov/uscolombiatpa/small_business (accessed August 7, 2015). 
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such as value added tax (VAT) reductions, and promotes access to financing. SME 
promotion is also an important priority in Asia. In 2002, China passed the SME pro-
motion law, which designated a central budget for promotion of small and medium 
enterprises across a variety of areas including credit provision, technological inno-
vation, exporting, environmental protection, and worker training. India, the focus 
of our study, has had extensive regulations in place to promote small and medium 
enterprises, based in part on its socialist legacy.
Much of the support for SMEs stems from the assumption that SMEs do a better 
job of promoting aggregate job creation. Yet the evidence to date on firm size and 
employment growth is inconclusive. For developing countries, a number of stud-
ies document that small firms grow faster than large firms (Mead and Liedholm 
1998; Gunning and Mengistae 2001; Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys 2002; Bigsten and 
Gebreeyesus 2007; Ayyagari,  Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2011). In contrast, 
van Biesebroeck (2005) shows that after controlling for a number of other charac-
teristics, medium and large firms in nine  sub-Saharan African countries grow faster 
than small firms. In developed countries, a number of early studies found that small 
firms grow more quickly (see, among others, Evans 1987a, b; Hall 1987; and Sutton 
1997). Neumark, Wall, and Zhang (2011) find evidence that small businesses create 
more jobs. However, they show that the negative relationship between firm size and 
job creation is sensitive to whether size is measured using base period size or aver-
age size of the enterprise. In particular, because of the possibility of mean reversion, 
estimates using average firm size show smaller but still significantly higher job cre-
ation rates for smaller firms.
Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) argue that earlier papers on US firms are 
flawed due to measurement issues and omitted variable bias. They present evidence 
showing that the higher employment growth of smaller enterprises disappears once 
they control for age. Haltiwanger Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) suggest that policy-
makers seeking to promote small businesses should also consider the effects of firm 
age. For US data, the evidence suggests both that younger firms grow faster than older 
firms, and that larger firms grow faster than smaller firms after conditioning on age.
One reason why it is so difficult to estimate both the effects of SME promotion 
as well as the job creation benefits of small firms is that firm size is not randomly 
assigned. In this paper, we use the elimination of a widespread policy to promote 
 small-scale enterprises to evaluate the effects of SME promotion on employment 
outcomes. India’s promotion of small and medium enterprises targeted products, 
not firms, and after decades of support was rapidly eliminated starting in 1997. We 
use the elimination of the program, which covered one-quarter of all formal sector 
establishments prior to the reform, to measure the employment, productivity, and 
wage effects of a reversal of SME promotion.
India is an ideal country to study SME promotion. For the past 60 years, India has 
attempted to boost employment growth by shielding small manufacturing establish-
ments from competition. Promotion measures have included the types of policies 
used all over the world: subsidized credit, technical assistance, excise tax exemp-
tions, preference in government procurement, and subsidies for power and capital. 
Until 1997, the premier instrument for protecting small establishments in India was 
its policy of reserving a number of products for exclusive production by  small-scale 
industry. Proponents of small establishment promotion argued that these policies 
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encouraged  labor-intensive growth, mitigated capital market imperfections, and 
shifted income toward lower wage earners (Hussain 1997).
Critics of SME promotion in India argued that these policies in fact discouraged 
firm growth and slowed the overall expansion of the manufacturing sector. Mohan 
(2002) argues that small establishments making reserved products were discour-
aged from growing or upgrading their technology, because they would have had 
to stop making those products if their investment grew above the allowed limits 
for  small-scale industry (SSI). Panagariya (2008) hypothesizes that the policy of 
reserving many  labor-intensive products for SSIs limited Indian exports of these 
products.
In this paper, we address whether SME promotion through product reservation is 
an effective way of promoting job creation. India’s dismantling of  small-scale reser-
vations—which were specifically geared toward promoting small establishments—
allows us to address the linkages between establishment size and job growth. We 
focus on the peak period for dismantling SSI reservations (2000 to 2007) to identify 
the impact on the growth of employment, output, investment, and wages. We use 
a newly available panel dataset from India’s Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). 
While these data were previously available as a repeated  cross section, the new data-
set provides unique establishment identifiers, allowing us to bypass the tricky busi-
ness of trying to link establishments through beginning and end of year accounting 
information. We also explore the net impact of  de-reservation at the product and dis-
trict levels. The panel dataset does not include district identifiers; however, we have 
created the first mapping of the panel dataset to district locations by merging these 
to annual  cross sections with district information which we purchased separately.2
We classify establishments as incumbents (those producing the reserved prod-
uct prior to the reforms) or entrants (those that moved into the product space after 
the product was  de-reserved). We find that when products were removed from the 
reserved list, overall employment, investment, and output grew. This growth was 
driven by entrants and by incumbents that were previously constrained by the capi-
tal limits. In contrast, smaller incumbents shrank.
What was the net effect of the  de-reservation on employment? To address this 
question, we explore the net impact of  de-reservation at the district level, exploiting 
the fact that SSI policies were set nationally but their effects varied locally depending 
on prior exposure. At the district level, the elimination of SSI policies was an exog-
enous shock whose severity was greatest in regions whose  preexisting production 
structure included a large share of reserved products. We link our  establishment-level 
data to the districts in which the establishments operate. We then compare changes 
in employment, output, investment, and wage outcomes for districts that were 
more or less exposed to the  de-reservation based on their  preexisting product mix. 
We find that districts that were more exposed to the  de-reservation based on their 
 preexisting product mix experienced higher employment and output growth over 
the period from 2000 to 2007. The results suggest that the average change in the 
fraction of  de-reserved employment (0.076) is associated with a 6 percent increase 
in  district-level employment.
2 Information on purchasing the ASI data can be found at http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/site/inner.
aspx?status=3&menu_id=73. 
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The  de-reservation may also have affected informal (unorganized) manufacturing 
employment.3 If  de-reservation simply pushed some workers into informality, then 
this would be a negative outcome that our ASI data would miss. To investigate this 
possibility, we conduct a similar,  district-level analysis using unorganized manufac-
turing surveys from 2000 and 2005. We find no statistically significant association 
between the fraction of  de-reservation and  district-level employment in unorganized 
manufacturing. If anything, the evidence suggests that  de-reservation may be asso-
ciated with workers shifting from the unorganized to the organized (formal) sector.
We are fortunate that most of India’s other major reforms, including delicensing 
and major trade reform episodes, were completed before the period of our analy-
sis. However, another important consideration is the potential endogeneity of the 
reforms. As an illustration, Chari and Gupta (2008), focusing on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) liberalization, show that India’s 1991 FDI liberalization was less 
likely in more concentrated sectors and sectors with a high share of state-owned 
enterprises. We address potential endogeneity of the SSI reforms by controlling for 
 product-level,  event-time trends in the years leading up to  de-reservation, and by 
documenting that there are no  pretreatment trends before products were  de-reserved. 
We also conduct a placebo test and find that the effect of the true  de-reservation 
remains robust, while the placebos show no effect.
Some might argue that India’s promotion of small firms could have been better 
designed. Perhaps a more sensible policy might have been more successful at pro-
moting employment for  small-scale businesses in India. Many countries promote 
small firms by facilitating access to credit; others provide worker training and tax 
relief. If large companies naturally generate higher employment growth, then such 
SME policies may not be optimal. Furthermore, these narrowly targeted policies 
impose additional costs that increase with establishment size, which ultimately dis-
courages growth. At the end of the paper, we also explore whether large Indian enter-
prises not affected by SME promotion had faster employment growth than smaller 
enterprises also outside the SME laws. Our results, which demonstrate a strong link 
between larger establishment size and employment growth, suggest caution in using 
SME promotion as a vehicle for job creation.
Others who have studied firm growth in India include Das (1995) and Shanmugam 
and Bhaduri (2002). Both studies document that small firms grow more quickly; 
however, these analyses are limited to small, specialized subsets of Indian manufac-
turing and do not shed light on why overall employment growth in  labor-intensive 
industries has been slow. More recently,  Garcia-Santana and  Pijoan-Mas (2014) 
calibrate a  span-of-control model that accounts for the reservation policy, using data 
from 2001, when most reservations were still in place. They simulate the effects 
of removing the reservation policy and predict that doing so would increase man-
ufacturing output per worker by nearly 7 percent. To our knowledge, ours is the 
first paper to empirically test the results of the actual dismantling of the SSI reser-
vations policy at the establishment level, which makes it quite complementary to 
 Garcia-Santana and  Pijoan-Mas. Our finding that the average decline in reserva-
tions would increase employment by approximately 6 percent at the  district level is 
3 India uses the terms unorganized and informal to mean slightly different things. Our data cover the unorga-
nized sector, although we use the two terms interchangeably. 
358 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW FEbRuARy 2017
remarkably close to the simulation results for output generated by their structural 
model. However, our primary focus is on generating employment, not output. More 
broadly, this paper contributes to the literature examining why so much employment 
in developing countries is found in small firms (La Porta and Shleifer 2008, 2014; 
McCaig and Pavcnik 2015; Tybout 2000, 2014; among others).
While this paper focuses primarily on the linkages between establishment size and 
employment growth, there is also a related literature on policy distortions, produc-
tivity growth, and reallocation of production in developing countries. This includes 
Aghion et al. (2008); Alfaro and Chari (2009, 2014); Banerjee (2006); Besley and 
Burgess (2004); Goldberg et al. (2010a, b); Hsieh and Olken (2014); McCaig and 
Pavcnik (2014); and Nataraj (2011). Aghion et al. (2008) and Besley and Burgess 
(2004) are both important early papers on the costs of regulation in India that show 
how licensing and labor market regulations had significant but heterogeneous costs 
for both growth and productivity. Besley and Burgess (2004) emphasize the move-
ment to informal sector enterprises as a result of regulation, an issue which we 
address at the end of this paper using data on unorganized manufacturing.
In India, Alfaro and Chari (2009, 2014) examine more broadly changes in market 
structure and firm behavior over a longer time period spanning before and after the 
1991 reforms. Alfaro and Chari (2009) find that firms which dominated in the early 
years continue to dominate in later decades, with the exception of the services sector 
where there is more significant dynamism. Despite significant entry by new firms, 
Alfaro and Chari show (using the Prowess data of all publicly listed firms) contin-
ued dominance of  state-owned enterprises and older manufacturing enterprises.4
Goldberg et al. (2010a) are the first authors to use  product-level data for India. 
They explore the determinants of new product introductions as a function of the ear-
lier trade reforms, which were largely completed by the time the SSI liberalization 
occurred. Goldberg et al. (2010a) find that falling input tariffs account for more than 
30 percent of new product introductions during their sample period. Goldberg et al. 
(2010b) examine whether the rationalization of product lines is linked to India’s 
trade reforms, and find very weak links between the two. Our paper has a differ-
ent, but complementary focus: we are interested in how the elimination of product 
restrictions that favored small establishments affected employment growth.
Our findings are also consistent with a growing theoretical literature on hetero-
geneous firms and productivity (Melitz 2003). Many of these papers show that 
reforms that reallocate production away from less efficient and toward more efficient 
firms are associated with significant productivity increases. Conversely, Garicano, 
LeLarge, and Van Reenen (2016) show that countries like France which retain 
 size-contingent labor regulations constrain firms from reaching optimal size (and 
consequently optimal productivity) levels. Aghion et al. (2008) develop a model 
in the working paper version of their article where the dismantling of the License 
Raj encourages firm entry and expansion among more productive firms, as well as 
exit and contraction among less productive firms, with more pronounced effects in 
4 Alfaro and Chari also examine the impact of the 1991 reforms on the overall size distribution of firms, finding 
that the reforms led to the entry of many small firms and reinforced the role of larger firms. Our paper is comple-
mentary to theirs, as we focus specifically on the removal of SSI policies, a reform that occurred after the major 
trade reforms and delicensing of earlier years. 
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regions with lower labor costs. The net effect is a reallocation of economic activity 
toward  pro-employer states.
In our context, the  de-reservation policy may be seen as lowering the fixed entry 
cost that establishments must pay in order to join a particular product market. The 
resulting increase in competition in the product market allows significant firm entry, 
which in turn lowers prices and raises the productivity level required for survival, as 
average productivity and wages rise. The smallest or least productive establishments 
are forced to exit the product space, and larger establishments increase their mar-
ket shares. Alternatively, we can view the reservations policy as affecting the opti-
mal behavior of  multiproduct establishments. Larger establishments that may have 
found it optimal to produce reserved products may not have been able to do so when 
the reservations policy was in place, and thus may have switched to a more opti-
mal allocation after the reforms. In addition, by raising competition,  de-reservation 
may have pushed establishments to specialize in products in their core competence 
(Eckel and Neary 2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I explains the 
rationale behind SSI reservation in India, describes the trends in reservation and 
 de-reservation, and reviews the datasets used in estimation. Section II identifies 
the impacts of SSI reservation policies on employment, investment, output, and 
wages over the 2000 through 2007 period. Section III presents additional robustness 
checks. Section IV examines SSI policy through the lens of the  size-age-growth 
relationship, and Section V concludes.
I. Promoting Small and Medium Enterprises in India
India has historically supported its  small-scale sector. According to Mohan 
(2002), one major reason was the government’s belief that employment genera-
tion is critical in a  labor-surplus economy. Many believed that SSIs, particularly 
 labor-intensive manufacturing enterprises, would be able to absorb surplus labor. 
One important pillar of the policy of SSI promotion was the reservation policy, initi-
ated in 1967. Under this policy, which applies exclusively to manufacturing, certain 
products were reserved for production by SSIs. Initially only 47 items were reserved 
(see Figure 1), but by 1996 that number had grown to more than 1,000 products. 
Mohan points out that the only selection criterion mentioned in official documents 
was the ability of SSIs to manufacture such items. He also notes—as does the report 
of an expert committee on small enterprises—that the choice of products was “arbi-
trary” (Hussain 1997; Mohan 2002).
SSIs were originally defined as industrial undertakings with up to Rs 500,000 
in fixed assets and fewer than 50 employees.5 Over time, the employment condi-
tion was dropped and the investment ceiling was raised, so that by 1999, industrial 
undertakings with up to Rs 10 million in plant and machinery (at historical cost) 
were considered SSIs.6 Large industrial undertakings that already made the reserved 
5 An industrial undertaking may include more than one establishment. As we discuss below, almost all observa-
tions in our data include only one establishment, and we conduct our analysis at the establishment level. 
6 Table A1 shows the evolution of SSI ceilings over time. The restriction on employment was dropped in 1960. 
The ceiling has been defined in terms of the original value of plant and machinery since 1966. The ceiling on invest-
ment in plant and machinery was raised to Rs 30 million in 1997, but was subsequently reduced to Rs 10 million in 
360 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW FEbRuARy 2017
products were allowed to continue manufacturing them, but their output was capped 
at current levels. Any further expansion or entry required a commitment to export 
the majority of output (Mohan 2002).
Despite India’s liberalization of a variety of industrial and trade policies in 1991, 
the reservation of products for SSIs remained in force until the late 1990s. However, 
the Advisory Committee on Reservation recognized growing concerns about SSI 
policies following the 1991 trade liberalization. SSIs had to compete with imported 
goods, and large undertakings (which had been grandfathered in) might be able to 
exercise monopoly power in the market for reserved goods, as most other producers 
would be small. Moreover, growing consumer demand for  high-quality goods, and 
ongoing technological progress, made it more difficult to produce many items in 
small undertakings. The advisory committee therefore appointed a special commit-
tee to reconsider the list of reserved items in 1995 (Hussain 1997). Based on rec-
ommendations from this committee, product  de-reservation began in 1997 (Figure 1 
and online Appendix Table B.3). While there were a few items removed from the list 
in earlier years,  large-scale  de-reservation started in 1997 (15 products) and picked 
up in 2002 (51 products). From 2003 to 2008, approximately 100 to 250 products 
were  de-reserved each year, with only 22 products remaining reserved at the end 
of that period. The greatest number of products (253) was  de-reserved at the end 
of our sample period, in 2007.7 In 2015, the last products were removed from the 
reservation list.
1999. Banerjee and Duflo (2014) use these changes to examine the impact of directed credit on firm performance. 
In 2006, the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Act raised the limit on plant and machinery for small enterprises 
to Rs 50 million. We would therefore expect the constraint of the SSI reservation policy to be less binding for the 
last year of our sample. 
7 The coverage also accelerated in 2007 as there were many establishments making several products that were 
 de-reserved in that year, the most common of which was “fire clay, bricks and blocks containing less than 40 percent 
alumina.” Nearly 4,500 incumbent establishments were making these bricks. Other items  de-reserved in 2007 were 
made by  200–500 incumbents each, which included sawn timber, bolts and nuts, reinforced cement concrete pipes, 
clay flooring tiles, shopping bags, and centrifugal pumps. It is not unusual in these types of reforms that the most 
Figure 1.  De-Reservation Policy
Notes: Data for 1967 through 1989 taken from Table 6.3 in Mohan (2002). Data for 1996 onward taken from vari-
ous publications of the Government of India, Ministry of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises.
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We mapped the list of SSI products to a panel of manufacturing establishments 
from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) from  2000–2001 through  2007–2008 
(for simplicity, we hereafter refer to these years as 2000 through 2007).8 The ASI 
provides a representative sample of all registered manufacturing establishments in 
India, with large establishments covered every year, and smaller establishments 
covered on a sampling basis.9 While previously the ASI did not release identifi-
ers that would allow researchers to follow the same unit across years, the Central 
Statistical Office recently reversed this policy and released a panel going back to 
1998. However, due to incomplete product coverage in 1998 and 1999 we are forced 
to begin our analysis in 2000. We drop 1998 and 1999 because without detailed 
product coverage we cannot identify which establishments were affected by SSI 
reservations and which were not.
The basic unit of observation in the ASI is an establishment (called a factory in 
the ASI data). The ASI allows owners who have more than one establishment in 
the same state and industry to provide a joint return, but very few (less than 5 per-
cent of our sample) do so, and our analysis is conducted at the level of the estab-
lishment. Establishments report products in the ASI survey using ASI Commodity 
Classification (ASICC) codes. We created a concordance between the SSI product 
codes—which indicate which products were reserved for small and medium enter-
prises—and the ASICC codes. We describe our procedure in online Appendix B.
Table 1 provides further details on the establishments in the ASI. Our dataset con-
tains approximately 30,000 establishments in any given year, 26 percent of which 
made at least one reserved product in 2000. Table 1 documents that SSI reservation 
policies were pervasive at the beginning of the sample period and affected one out 
of four establishments in our sample. By 2007, however, less than 10 percent of 
establishments were making reserved products. Table 1 also shows that establish-
ments making  de-reserved products were, on average, slightly younger than estab-
lishments making reserved products.
One obvious question is how to assess the quality of the ASI data. The ASI has 
only recently been released with panel identifiers that allow us to track individual 
establishments over time. In online Appendix B, we show that there is a high level 
of consistency in opening and closing stock variables reported by a given establish-
ment from year to year. This data quality is consistent across state, industry, time, 
and establishment size, and suggests that the ASI panel correctly identifies annual 
observations belonging to each establishment.
A number of researchers have instead used the Prowess database, which is cre-
ated and maintained by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). The 
products are deregulated at the end. For the dismantling of the  Multi-Fibre Agreement, for example, most items 
were removed from the restricted list in the very last year of the reform. 
8 The ASI uses the accounting year, which runs from April 1 to March 31. We refer to each accounting year 
based on the start of the period; for example, the year we call “2000” runs from April 1, 2000 to March 31, 2001. 
Because the product  de-reservation in 2008 took place at the tail end of the  2007–2008 accounting year, we do not 
count these products as being  de-reserved during  2007–2008. 
9 From the  2000–2001 to  2002–2003 accounting years, the ASI census sector included all industrial units with 
200 or more workers. In addition, all public sector units, and all units in 12 of India’s least developed states were 
included in the census sector. Certain units with fewer than 200 workers, but with a large value of output, were also 
assigned to the census sector. Starting in accounting year  2003–2004, the census sector was modified to include all 
units with 100 or more workers, for both the private and public sectors. In addition, establishments in five of the 
least developed states were covered under the census sector. 
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Prowess database is useful for studying the behavior of large firms, including pric-
ing and markups, privatization, firm size distribution and firm dynamics, the polit-
ical economy of FDI liberalization, product switching, and the use of imported 
intermediate goods (see, among others, Gupta 2005; Chari and Gupta 2008; Alfaro 
and Chari 2009, 2014; Goldberg et al. 2010a, b; DeLoecker et al. 2016). However, 
since Prowess focuses on large firms, it would not be appropriate for our examina-
tion of a  small-scale reservation policy.10
As our focus is on employment trends over time, the ASI data are by far the most 
comprehensive panel available for the Indian manufacturing sector. In 2000, the 
Prowess database listed output and capital data for over 7,000 firms, but only listed 
employment data for 90 firms, while the ASI had employment data on 30,850 estab-
lishments. By the end of our sample period, in 2007, the Prowess database had sig-
nificantly improved its employment coverage to 774 firms, but it still lagged behind 
the ASI which reported employment data for 36,145 establishments.11 Mohanan 
and Chopra (2012) raise the concern that there are only 4,018 establishments that 
appear in all 10 years of the ASI panel for 1998 through 2007. For the period we 
consider (2000 through 2007), the ASI reports both wage and employment data 
for over 6,000 establishments over all 8 years.12 For the same  eight-year period, 
Prowess does not have superior  full-panel coverage: it reports wage data in every 
year for 4,474 firms and employment data in every year for 37 firms.13
10 Another advantage of the ASI over Prowess is that the ASI reports the locations where establishments operate, 
whereas Prowess typically reports the headquarters location. 
11 A  year-by-year comparison of ASI and Prowess coverage for our key variables is reported in online 
Appendix Table B.2. 
12 For shorter series, the ASI coverage is much greater. In part, this reflects the fact that the ASI also covers small 
establishments where there is a lot of churning (entry and exit). 
13 Another advantage of the ASI is that it allows us to observe even the smallest firms, albeit with lower sam-
pling frequency and estimated sampling multipliers. There may be a concern that  within-establishment regressions 
are not ideal for SSI analysis because smaller establishments are sampled less frequently than larger ones. We 
address this concern in three ways. First, we note that the SSI cutoff is  capital-based whereas the sampling frame 
is  labor-based. We therefore frequently observe establishments that may be large by labor standards but are small 
in terms of capital investment, and hence SSI, standards. Second, we look at a period that is long enough that 
even infrequently sampled establishments are likely to be observed at least twice. Specifically, 64 percent of the 
establishments observed making a reserved product while it was reserved make it into our  establishment-level 
regressions. Third, we complement our  establishment-level regressions with district-, product-, and, (in the online 
Table 1—Summary Statistics for ASI Manufacturing Establishments by Participation  
in Reserved Product Market
Manufacturing reserved product Manufacturing  de-reserved product
Not manufacturing products that 
were ever reserved
Labor Age Labor Age Labor Age
(000s) (mean) Establishments (000s) (mean) Establishments (000s) (mean) Establishments
2000 1,515 16.4  8,040 26%   72 17.3 1,327  4% 3,596 19.3 21,483 70%
2001 1,355 16.8  7,995 24%  306 13.7 2,433  7% 3,616 19.0 22,505 68%
2002 1,384 16.9  8,293 25%  353 14.6 2,820  9% 3,626 19.4 21,966 66%
2003 1,311 16.7 10,194 23%  601 15.7 4,247 10% 3,863 18.5 30,006 68%
2004 1,085 17.1  8,153 21%  857 15.8 4,685 12% 3,711 18.8 25,606 67%
2005  936 16.9  7,797 19% 1,177 15.6 6,106 15% 3,990 17.7 27,976 67%
2006  752 16.2  6,981 17% 1,471 15.6 6,782 16% 4,190 17.0 27,444 67%
2007  452 17.4  3,229  9% 1,908 16.3 8,806 24% 4,407 17.1 24,148 67%
Notes: Summary statistics for all establishments are authors’ calculations based on ASI data. No sampling multipliers 
applied. Labor is total for each  group-year, in thousands. Age represents mean value for each  group-year. Percentages 
indicate percent of total number of establishments producing reserved (or de-reserved) products in each given year.
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In summary, for the purposes of our analyses, the ASI data are the most com-
prehensive and appropriate panel available, and appear to be of reasonable quality. 
Online Appendix B includes further details on the nature and quality of the ASI 
panel.
II. Removal of  Small-Scale Reservation Policies
In this section, we use the dismantling of the SSI reservation policy documented 
in Figure 1 to measure its impact on establishments of different sizes and ages. While 
we are particularly interested in the impact on employment, we also report conse-
quences for investment, output, wages, and labor productivity. Legally,  small-scale 
reservation policies applied primarily to establishments with a historical cost of 
plant and machinery below Rs 10 million during our sample years. Consequently 
we would expect a heterogeneous response to the removal of reservation policies 
across establishments depending on whether they were constrained by the Rs 10 
million ceiling.14
Our level of analysis is primarily at the establishment level. Subsequent sec-
tions demonstrate that our results are consistent across the district-, product-, and 
 industry-levels of analysis.
A.  Establishment-Level Effects of  De-Reservation
When we classify an establishment as making a reserved or  de-reserved product, 
we consider every product that the establishment makes, not just its main product. 
We begin by noting whether an establishment is ever observed making any product 
that was ever on the reserved list (regardless of whether it was  de-reserved); we 
refer to these as SSI products. For 92 percent of establishments that ever make an 
SSI product, this procedure identifies only one product, which we call the establish-
ment’s main SSI product.15
The main SSI product assigned to an establishment does not change over time. 
Rather, the variable Deres goes from 0 to 1 when the product is  de-reserved. We start 
with a  difference-in-differences (DID) equation of the following form for establish-
ment  i in year  t :
(1)  y it  = β  Deres it +  α i +  α t +  ω it .
Appendix),  industry-level regressions, that include every establishment, even those observed only once. Our results 
are robust to these different specifications. 
14 As noted above, in 2006, the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Act raised the limit on plant and machin-
ery for small enterprises to Rs 50 million. However, since this change was only made official in September 2006, 
and our sample period only extends to 2007, we focus on the Rs 10 million threshold. 
15 For the remaining 8 percent of establishments that ever make an SSI product, this procedure identifies mul-
tiple SSI products. In about 40 percent of those cases, the multiple products were  de-reserved in the same year, 
so the difference does not affect our results. In the remaining cases, establishments are observed producing more 
than one reserved product with different years of  de-reservation. In the  establishment-level regressions we attri-
bute to those establishments the year of  de-reservation that comes first. In the  district-level,  industry-level and 
 product-level regressions, we aggregate from the  product-level rather than the  establishment-level, so we assign 
year of  de-reservation to each specific product. 
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The dependent variable  y it is alternatively defined as the (log of) employment, 
output, capital, the average  per-employee wage, or labor productivity (output/
employee) of establishment  i at time  t . Employment is defined as the total number 
of employees. Throughout the paper, output and capital are defined in real terms, 
where output is deflated by the wholesale price index (WPI) for the appropriate 
product category, and capital is deflated by the WPI for plant and machinery. Wages 
are measured by dividing the total annual wage bill, deflated by the consumer price 
index, by the number of employees. We also measure labor productivity as real out-
put divided by the number of employees.
 Dere s it is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the establishment’s main SSI 
product has been  de-reserved. Where possible, we include all establishments—even 
those that do not help to identify  β because they are not affected by the reserva-
tion policy—because these establishments help to identify the secular year trends in 
establishment performance.
Because we are controlling for both year ( α t ) and establishment ( α i ) fixed 
effects,  β is identified from a combination of (i) products becoming  de-reserved 
and (ii) establishments switching into making (de)reserved products. To distin-
guish between these channels, we classify establishments based on whether they 
are incumbents and entrants into the product market. We create a dummy variable 
Incumbent that equals 1 if an establishment ever made an SSI product before it was 
 de-reserved. Similarly, we create a dummy variable Entrant that equals 1 if an estab-
lishment ever made an SSI product after it was  de-reserved, but not before. Both 
incumbent and entrant status are  time-invariant. Note that our establishment fixed 
effects absorb the direct impacts of being an incumbent or entrant, so we interact the 
Deres variable with indicator variables for Incumbent and Entrant:
(2)  y it  = γ  Deres it ×  Incumbent i + ρ  Deres it ×  Entrant i +  α t +  EntryYear i ∗  α t 
 +  α i +  ϵ it .
In all of our  establishment-level regressions, we recognize that establishments 
entering into a new product space may be fundamentally different from those that 
do not. We address this possible selection in two ways. First, we identify the first 
year in which we see an establishment switching the main product that it makes 
(regardless of whether it is an SSI product).16 We assign the establishment this 
Entry Year into a new product space. When we separate results by incumbents and 
entrants, we control for an interaction between this year of entry and year fixed 
effects. This creates a  nonparametric control for unobserved,  time-varying charac-
teristics for establishments that switched into new product spaces in each year.17 In 
an alternate specification, discussed in Section III and shown in Table 10, we con-
trol for whether an establishment changes the main product it makes in any given 
year. With these two sets of controls, we interpret the coefficients for entrants as the 
effect of  de-reservation conditional on the decision to enter a new product space.
16 We do not count this as a switch if the establishment immediately switches back to making the original 
product. 
17 Our results are robust to using a separate linear time trend for each year of entry into a new product space. 
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While we do not control for potentially confounding policy changes, other major 
reforms with heterogeneous effects across manufacturing products were limited 
during this time period. By 1998, 93 percent of industries were no longer subject 
to licensing requirements. Major changes in policies  vis-à-vis foreign investment 
occurred in the early 1990s, and then stalled during the period of SSI reform. Nataraj 
(2011) shows that tariffs were largely harmonized across industries by the late 1990s, 
so even though there were some reductions during the 2000s the variation in tariff 
rates across product types had fallen dramatically by the start of the sample period.
Our  establishment-level results from estimating equations (1) and (2) are reported 
in Table 2. The point estimates in panel A of Table 2 indicate that when we do not 
distinguish between incumbents and entrants,  de-reservation across the entire sam-
ple of establishments had no statistically significant impact on employment or cap-
ital. However, removal of  small-scale reservation was associated with a significant 
increase in the  per-employee wage and a marginally significant increase in output. 
The coefficients on output and wages indicate that on average across all establish-
ments, the removal of  small-scale reservation was associated with a 2.4 percent 
increase in output and a 1.3 percent increase in the average (real) wage.18
18 Changes are estimated as  [exp (b)  − 1] for each coefficient  b . 
Table 2—Impact of  De-Reservation on  Establishment-Level Outcomes
log(labor) log(output) log(capital) log(wage) log(Q/L)
Panel A. Aggregate results
 t ≥ year  de-reserved −0.00428 0.0232 0.00628 0.0131 0.0158
(0.00862) (0.0120) (0.00992) (0.00485) (0.00973)
Establishment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 298,984 294,157 292,998 296,575 294,157
Establishments 130,397 128,033 127,822 128,986 128,033
 R 2 0.006 0.011 0.003 0.026 0.007
Panel B. Incumbents versus entrants
Incumbent ×  t ≥ year  de-reserved −0.0211 −0.0183 −0.0110 0.00109 −0.0151
(0.00948) (0.0128) (0.0106) (0.00508) (0.0102)
Entrant ×  t ≥ year  de-reserved 0.0733 0.230 0.0853 0.0703 0.179
(0.0193) (0.0325) (0.0254) (0.0138) (0.0275)
Establishment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of entry × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 298,984 294,157 292,998 296,575 294,157
Establishments 130,397 128,033 127,822 128,986 128,033
 R 2 0.008 0.014 0.004 0.027 0.009
Notes: Results from  establishment-level regressions. Dependent variables are shown in column headings. 
“ t ≥ year  de-reserved” is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the product associated with the establishment 
is removed from the list of reserved products. Incumbent indicates that the establishment previously made the prod-
uct when it had reserved status. Entrant indicates that the establishment only made the product after it had been 
 de-reserved. In panel B we control for the interaction between year of entry and year fixed effects, where the year 
of entry is the first year in which we see an establishment switching the main product that it makes (regardless of 
whether it is an SSI product or not). Q/L indicates labor productivity (real output divided by number of employees). 
Errors are clustered at the establishment level.
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These averages mask considerable heterogeneity among incumbents and entrants. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows that for entrants into a previously reserved product space, 
employment, output, capital investment, wages, and labor productivity increased 
significantly. Employment increased by 7.7 percent, output by 26 percent, and cap-
ital investment by 9 percent. Average real wages increased by 7 percent. In keeping 
with the relatively large increase in output relative to employment, labor productiv-
ity increased by nearly 20 percent.
For incumbents that previously produced reserved products and remained in the 
sample, the coefficients on all outcome variables are smaller in magnitude and, 
with the exception of the employment results, statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. The coefficient on employment is significant and negative, suggesting that 
 de-reservation is associated with a 2.1 percent decrease in employment among 
incumbents. These findings suggest that with  de-reservation, the average incumbent 
shrank, while the average entrant grew.19
B. Endogeneity of  De-Reservation Timing
Our baseline specifications include establishment fixed effects, which control 
for any  time-invariant,  establishment-level characteristics that are correlated with 
 de-reservation. Furthermore, all SSI products were eventually  de-reserved by 2015. 
Therefore, we are not concerned that certain SSI products, but not others, were stra-
tegically chosen for  de-reservation.
However, since our identification strategy exploits the differential timing of 
 de-reservation, one potential concern is that products were strategically chosen 
for  de-reservation during certain years. Documents from the Ministry of Micro, 
Small and Medium Enterprises indicate that products were  de-reserved based on 
the recommendations of a special committee. Committee members were asked to 
consider a variety of factors when determining which products to  de-reserve, includ-
ing the labor intensity of production, the minimum economic scale of production, 
and consumer interests.20 Critically, the committee indicated that some products 
were selected for  de-reservation based on recent changes in product innovation. 
Therefore, it is possible that the product markets for  de-reserved items were chang-
ing in a systematically different way than the markets for  non-de-reserved items.
To address this concern, we  rerun our establishment level regressions controlling 
for  product-level  event-time trends. Specifically, we create an  event-time variable, 
τ , which is equal to the year of  de-reservation minus the current year.  τ equals −1 
in the year prior to  de-reservation, 0 in the year of  de-reservation, 1 in the year fol-
lowing  de-reservation, and so forth.  τ is set equal to 0 for any establishments that 
do not make a reserved product. We  reestimate equations (1) and (2) including this 
19 Joint  F-tests reject that the coefficients on incumbents and entrants are the same for all outcomes. 
20 The special committee produced a report identifying products for  de-reservation. This report indicated a 
number of reasons for selecting the first set of products recommended for  de-reservation, namely: feasibility of pro-
ducing quality products given the threshold on investment; need for higher investment due to product innovation; 
safety and hygiene issues associated with certain products; export potential; resource utilization; and the creation 
of a “monopoly like situation” in certain product markets due to the Carry On Business licenses granted to large 
establishments (Hussain 1997). 
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 event-time variable, thereby controlling for any potential  preexisting, linear trend in 
the outcome of interest in the years prior to  de-reservation:
 (1a)  y it  = β  Deres it +  τ it +  α i +  α t +  ω it 
(2a)  y it  = γ  Deres it ×  Incumbent i + ρ  Deres it ×  Entrant i +  τ it +  α t 
 +  EntryYear i ∗  α t +  α i +  ϵ it .
Table 3 shows that the baseline results are robust to controlling for these trends. 
In panel A, the coefficient on output is larger and statistically significant at a higher 
level (1 percent instead of 10 percent). Because of the larger increase in output, the 
coefficient on labor productivity also rises and is now statistically significant at the 
5 percent level. The coefficients on labor and capital remain indistinguishable from 
zero, and the coefficient on wage is nearly unchanged.
Table 3—Impact of  De-Reservation on  Establishment-Level Outcomes, Controlling for Time Trend
log(labor) log(output) log(capital) log(wage) log(Q/L)
Panel A. Aggregate results
 t ≥ year  de-reserved −0.000590 0.0371 −0.00954 0.0129 0.0232
(0.00896) (0.0125) (0.0106) (0.00511) (0.0103)
Time relative to de-reservation −0.00151 −0.00566 0.00645 0.00009 −0.00302
 (0.00182) (0.00268) (0.00252) (0.00101) (0.00213)
Establishment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 298,984 294,157 292,998 296,575 294,157
Establishments 130,397 128,033 127,822 128,986 128,033
 R2 0.006 0.011 0.003 0.026 0.007
Panel B. Incumbents versus entrants
Incumbent ×  t ≥ year  de-reserved −0.0146 −0.000433 −0.0244 0.00117 −0.00566
(0.00976) (0.0132) (0.0113) (0.00536) (0.0107)
Entrant ×   t ≥ year  de-reserved 0.0798 0.249 0.0718 0.0704 0.189
(0.0196) (0.0327) (0.0257) (0.0138) (0.0277)
Time relative to  de-reservation −0.00264 −0.00732 0.00545 −0.00004 −0.00386
(0.00182) (0.00269) (0.00253) (0.00101) (0.00214)
Establishment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of entry × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 298,984 294,157 292,998 296,575 294,157
Establishments 130,397 128,033 127,822 128,986 128,033
 R2 0.008 0.014 0.004 0.027 0.009
Notes: Results from  establishment-level regressions. Dependent variables are shown in column headings. 
“t  ≥ year  de-reserved” is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the product associated with the establishment 
is removed from the list of reserved products. Incumbent indicates that the establishment previously made the prod-
uct when it had reserved status. Entrant indicates that the establishment only made the product after it had been 
 de-reserved. Time relative to  de-reservation is an event time trend that equals the year of  de-reservation minus the 
current year (and is always equal to 0 for establishments that never made SSI products). In panel B we control for 
the interaction between year of entry and year fixed effects, where the year of entry is the first year in which we 
see an establishment switching the main product that it makes (regardless of whether it is an SSI product or not). 
Q/L indicates labor productivity (real output divided by number of employees). Errors are clustered at the estab-
lishment level.
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In panel B, the coefficient on labor for incumbents becomes less negative and sta-
tistically insignificant at conventional levels, whereas the coefficient on capital for 
incumbents becomes more negative in magnitude and statistically significant. For 
entrants, we continue to see a strong, positive relationship between  de-reservation 
and all outcomes, with similar magnitudes and statistical significance.
C. Effects of  De-Reservation by Establishment Size and Age
We now explore whether the impacts of  de-reservation differed by establishment 
size and age. We measure size based on the historical value of fixed assets, which 
was used as a threshold to determine eligibility for the manufacture of reserved 
products.
Reserved products could typically be produced only by “industrial undertak-
ings” with historical values of plant and machinery (P&M) below a certain value. 
However, undertakings with historical capital investment above the threshold could 
produce reserved products if they committed to exporting a majority of production. 
Moreover, large incumbent undertakings (those that were already manufacturing the 
product before it was reserved, or small incumbent undertakings that grew above 
the threshold) could obtain a Carry On Business license to continue production. 
However, these undertakings were constrained to produce no more than they had 
previously produced.
Table 4 shows how the effect of  de-reservation varied for establishments that 
reported average book values of P&M above versus below the Rs 10 million thresh-
old prior to  de-reservation. In this table, we limit the sample to establishments where 
we observe plant and machinery in at least one year prior to  de-reservation.21 In 
panel A, we find that  de-reservation reduced employment among establishments that 
were previously below the threshold. The point estimate is significant, and indicates 
that on average these establishments reduced employment by 4.1 percent. However, 
the reforms increased employment, output, capital, and wages among constrained 
establishments, defined as those that had exceeded the 10 million Rs threshold. For 
these establishments, the increase in employment averaged 5 percent, while output 
increased by 6 percent.
In panel B, we split the results by incumbents versus entrants. Incumbents with 
plant and machinery within the SSI cap prior to the reforms significantly reduced 
employment and output by nearly 6 percent, and labor productivity declined. In 
contrast, entrants over the SSI cap increased employment by 13 percent and out-
put by over 15 percent. Larger incumbents that were presumably grandfathered, 
and constrained by historical output levels, also exhibited significant increases 
in employment, output, and wages. These positive results for larger incumbents 
are particularly interesting because they indicate that the driving mechanism for 
 employment  generation is not the distinction between entrants and incumbents, but 
the size constraints imposed on larger establishments.
21 This restriction does not exclude entrants, because we do not require that the establishment be observed 
making the reserved product prior to  de-reservation. For example, if an entrant started to make tapioca flour after 
it was  de-reserved in 2004, and we observed that entrant’s plant and machinery prior to 2004 (when it was making 
other products), then we include it. 
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We also find a large increase in output among entrants who would have been 
within the threshold (and thus allowed to enter the product space) even before 
 de-reservation. One likely reason is that the product reservations discouraged even 
small establishments from entering the product space, since they would have known 
that they could not grow beyond a certain limit. Another possibility is that there 
may have been monopolistic conditions created by large, grandfathered incumbents. 
Once reservations were lifted and  de-reserved product markets became more com-
petitive, smaller establishments entered and grew. These small entrants increased 
output by over 25 percent and capital stock by 8 percent, with insignificant increases 
in employment. Thus, labor productivity and wages among these small entrants also 
increased substantially.
Table 4—Impact of  De-Reservation on  Establishment-Level Outcomes,  
by Value of Plant and Machinery
log(labor) log(output) log(capital) log(wage) log(Q/L)
Panel A. Aggregate results
Within SSI cap ×   t ≥ year  de-reserved −0.0421 −0.0116 −0.00683 0.00599 0.0140
(0.0104) (0.0145) (0.0122) (0.00599) (0.0119)
Over SSI cap ×   t ≥ year  de-reserved 0.0509 0.0602 0.0364 0.0273 0.00938
(0.0144) (0.0201) (0.0155) (0.00758) (0.0160)
Establishment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Current age group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 268,162 263,875 266,285 266,194 263,875
Establishments 112,864 110,772 112,647 111,697 110,772
 R2 0.021 0.031 0.004 0.046 0.016
Panel B. Incumbents versus entrants
Incumbent × within SSI cap × −0.0571 −0.0603 −0.0255 −0.00947 −0.0264
  t ≥ year  de-reserved (0.0113) (0.0150) (0.0130) (0.00622) (0.0122)
Entrant × within SSI cap × 0.0162 0.236 0.0759 0.0892 0.243
  t ≥ year  de-reserved (0.0243) (0.0442) (0.0339) (0.0182) (0.0375)
Incumbent × over SSI cap × 0.0391 0.0456 0.0234 0.0258 0.00351
  t ≥ year  de-reserved (0.0162) (0.0228) (0.0171) (0.00833) (0.0179)
Entrant × over SSI cap × 0.128 0.154 0.0923 0.0322 0.0441
  t ≥ year  de-reserved (0.0287) (0.0389) (0.0353) (0.0178) (0.0336)
Establishment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of entry × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Current age group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 268,162 263,875 266,285 266,194 263,875
Establishments 112,864 110,772 112,647 111,697 110,772
 R2 0.023 0.033 0.005 0.047 0.018
Notes: Results from  establishment-level regressions. Dependent variables are shown in column headings. “t  ≥ year 
 de-reserved” is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the product associated with the establishment is removed 
from the list of reserved products. Within/over SSI cap refers to whether an establishment’s average estimated value 
of plant and machinery in years pre- de-reservation exceeded Rs 10 million. Incumbent indicates that the establish-
ment previously made the product when it had reserved status. Entrant indicates that the establishment only made 
the product after it had been  de-reserved. In panel B we control for the interaction between year of entry and year 
fixed effects, where the year of entry is the first year in which we see an establishment switching the main prod-
uct that it makes (regardless of whether it is an SSI product or not). Q/L indicates labor productivity (real output 
divided by number of employees). Errors are clustered at the establishment level.
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We would expect that if the SSI threshold were a binding constraint prior to 
the reforms, the most productive incumbent establishments would have grown until 
they reached the threshold. Incumbent establishments just below the threshold, and 
those that reached the threshold and were granted Carry on Business licenses should 
benefit most from  de-reservation. Figure 2 shows the effects of  de-reservation across 
size categories of plant and machinery (P&M) for incumbent establishments. The 
horizontal axis shows the average,  pre-de-reservation P&M size category, and the 
vertical axis shows the regression coefficients from the interaction between the 
 pre-de-reservation P&M size category and the  de-reservation dummy, for incum-
bents. The results show that the largest effects are observed for establishments that 
were just below the Rs 10 million threshold. Figure 2 suggests that incumbents 
just below the threshold, with between 9 million and 10 million Rs in historical 
value of plant and machinery, were in fact constrained by the reservation policy, 
and increased their capital investment the most after  de-reservation. Investment by 
incumbents just above the threshold also increased.
Figure 3 further examines the role of size as well as age. We  reestimate equa-
tion (1), interacting the  de-reservation indicator with dummy variables for multiple 
size categories of P&M and age categories. The two horizontal axes show the aver-
age,  pre-de-reservation P&M size and age categories, and the vertical axis shows the 
regression coefficients from the interaction between the size/age categories and the 
 de-reservation dummy. This figure confirms that larger establishments grew faster 
with  de-reservation, while smaller establishments shrank, with growth concentrated 
among younger age classes.
On average, establishments with more than 10 million Rs in P&M prior to 
 de-reservation showed employment growth following  de-reservation. Within each 
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Figure 2. Impact of  De-Reservation among Incumbent Establishments near the Investment Threshold
Notes: Coefficients from a regression of log of nominal plant and machinery value on  de-reservation, for incum-
bents in the product space. Establishments with historical investment in plant and machinery up to Rs 10 million 
(illustrated by the dashed line) could be considered  small-scale industries.
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of these larger size classes, the fastest growing establishments were typically the 
younger ones. Conversely, for establishments previously below the 10 million Rs 
threshold, the coefficient on  de-reservation is negative for many size and age catego-
ries. However, establishments with P&M between 9 and 10 million Rs—those that 
were just below the threshold, and were therefore likely to have been constrained by 
it—saw some of the largest increases in employment with  de-reservation. Notably, 
most other growth among small establishments was concentrated among young 
establishments. The establishments most negatively affected in terms of employ-
ment contraction were the smallest, oldest ones.
Taken together, these findings suggest that  de-reservation increased the tendency 
of larger, younger establishments to grow relative to smaller, older establishments. 
The growth in employment was driven both by entrants that moved into the previ-
ously reserved product space, as well as by large incumbents that were previously 
constrained by the reservation ceiling.
D.  Product-Level Analysis
Our identification strategy relies on changes in employment and other outcomes 
in establishments observed both before and after  de-reservation. However, because 
the ASI includes a census of all large establishments each year, but only covers a 
subset of smaller establishments, the sample of establishments that we observe both 
before and after  de-reservation is not representative of the entire universe of ASI 
establishments, and is biased toward larger establishments. In our sample, median 
employment among establishments making reserved, SSI products and  reporting 
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Figure 3. Impact of  De-Reservation on Employment by Size and Age
Notes: Coefficients from a regression of log of employment on  de-reservation, interacted with a dummy variable 
for each P&M size and age class. P&M size and age are measured as the average in years prior to  de-reservation. 
Establishments with historical investment in plant and machinery up to Rs 10 million could be considered 
 small-scale industries.
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plant and machinery below Rs 10 million (the cutoff for SSI classification) is 
23 workers, compared with 34 workers for establishments that do not make SSI 
products.
To study the net aggregate effect of the  de-reservation taking into account all estab-
lishments, we redo the analysis at the product level. We conduct the following regres-
sion of outcome  y on a dummy variable for  de-reservation at the product level  p :
(3)  y pt  = β  Deres pt +  α p +  α t +  μ pt .
We allocate output using reported  product-level revenues. To construct  product-level 
labor, capital, wage, and number of establishments, we allocate each of these vari-
ables based on the share of revenues associated with that product. We apply sampling 
multipliers to all  infrequently sampled firms and weight the product level regres-
sions using initial employment. Table 5 shows that  de-reservation is associated with 
an increase in the number of establishments making a product, and with increases in 
labor, output, capital, and wages. The estimates suggest that product  de-reservation 
was associated with an average increase in the number of establishments producing 
a product of nearly 15 percent. For products that were  de-reserved, employment 
increased by 50 percent, output by nearly 35 percent, capital by 45 percent, and 
wages by 6 percent. These large effects are all significant at the 5 percent level, and 
most are significant at the 1 percent level. At the product level, the increase in labor 
is greater than the increase in output, leading to a fall in labor productivity.
We also use the  product-level regressions to conduct two additional robustness 
tests. First, we again check for endogenous product choice by testing for significant 
trends at the product level in outcomes prior to the reform. We run a  product-level 
regression of  de-reservation (equal to 1 in the year of  de-reservation) on lagged, first 
difference changes in the  product-level outcomes of interest (employment, output, 
capital, and wages). If government officials took a product off the reservation list 
in response to increasing employment or output growth, then the coefficients in our 
regressions should be statistically significant.
Because some products were not observed in every year, we calculate the lagged 
first difference at time  t by taking the outcome in the previous period observed 
Table 5—Impact of  De-Reservation on  Product-Level Outcomes
log(labor) log(output) log(capital) log(wage) log(Q/L) log(estab)
 t ≥ year  de-reserved 0.423 0.295 0.378 0.0593 −0.128 0.136
(0.0785) (0.0650) (0.0964) (0.0218) (0.0586) (0.0549)
Product fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,494 29,494 29,474 29,493 29,494 29,543
Products  4,126  4,126  4,126  4,126  4,126  4,126
 R 2 0.020 0.018 0.011 0.009 0.080 0.009
Notes: Results from  product-level regressions. Dependent variables are shown in column headings. “ t ≥ year 
 de-reserved” is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the product is removed from the list of reserved prod-
ucts. Q/L indicates labor productivity (real output divided by number of employees). Regressions are weighted by 
initial labor shares. Standard errors are clustered at the product level.
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( t _ lag ), minus the outcome in the prior period observed ( t _ lag2 ), and dividing by 
the gap between  t _ lag and t _lag2 . We then estimate the following:
(4)  Deres pt  = β ( 
Outcome  (t _ lag) p − Outcome  (t _ lag2) p     ______________________________ 
t _ lag − t _ lag2 ) +  α p +  α t +  ω pt .
We include all products for which we observe lagged,  first-differenced out-
comes, even those that were never reserved or  de-reserved. For products that were 
 de-reserved, we limit the sample to years up to the year of  de-reservation, so as not 
to include the effects of  de-reservation. Table 6 shows the results. We find no evi-
dence that  pre-de-reservation trends in the outcomes differed systematically prior to 
the year of  de-reservation. The point estimates are insignificant and close to 0.
We also conduct a placebo test, in the spirit of Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009), 
by randomizing  de-reservation across remaining products. To do so, we randomly 
select ASI products and attribute a year of  de-reservation to them, mirroring the 
distribution of years of  de-reservation for the true  de-reserved products. We perform 
this exercise 100 times. For each iteration, we run the following regression for each 
outcome of interest:
(5)  y pt  = β  Deres pt + δ  Placebo Deres pt +  α p +  α t +  μ pt .
Because products that were actually  de-reserved could be selected for the placebo 
treatment, we control for true  de-reservation in order to avoid confounding the pla-
cebo effect with the true treatment effect.
Table 7, panel A shows the results from one of our 100 placebo runs, while panel B 
summarizes the number of runs that were significantly above or below 0 at the 5 per-
cent level, for each outcome of interest. For most outcomes, 10 or fewer runs were 
Table 6—Pre-De-Reservation Trends at the Product Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lag  Δ labor 0.001
(0.001)
lag  Δ output −0.00006
(0.0007)
lag  Δ capital 0.0003
(0.0006)
lag  Δ wage 0.0003
(0.002)
Observations 20,870 20,870 20,851 20,869
Products  4,010  4,010  4,010  4,010
 R 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Notes: Results from  product-level regressions of  de-reservation (equal to 1 in the year of 
 de-reservation) on lagged, first difference changes in labor, output, capital, and wage. The num-
ber of products and observations is fewer than in Table 5 because (i) we only observe lagged 
 first-differences in outcomes for  2002–2007 and (ii) for  de-reserved products we only include 
years until  de-reservation in order to avoid picking up the effects of  de-reservation. Regressions 
are weighted by initial labor shares. Standard errors are clustered at the product level.
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significant at the 5 percent level, and those that were significant were fairly evenly 
split between positive and negative results. One outcome of interest—labor produc-
tivity—did exhibit 17 runs that were significantly different from 0, 12 of which were 
positive, which is the opposite direction from our true results (see Table 5). Overall, 
5.8 percent of the results were positive while 3.7 percent were negative. Panel C shows 
an empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) from the 100 placebo results for 
employment and output. As expected with a successful placebo test, the true coeffi-
cients—shown by vertical lines—are at the far right of the CDF in each case.22
22 We control for true  de-reservation to avoid conflating true effects with false effects. However, we also tried the 
same placebo test without controlling for the real  de-reservation, and results were similar. Overall around 5 percent 
of the results were positive while 5 percent were negative, again suggesting the absence of a placebo effect. 
Table 7—Placebo Tests at the Product Level
log(labor) log(output) log(capital) log(wage) log(Q/L) log(estab)
Panel A. Sample  product-level placebo test
 t ≥ year  de-reserved 0.420 0.293 0.371 0.0589 −0.127 0.136
(0.0786) (0.0654) (0.0965) (0.0218) (0.0587) (0.0551)
Placebo  t ≥  year  de-reserved −0.144 −0.0873 −0.315 −0.0185 0.0567 −0.0363
(0.121) (0.109) (0.164) (0.0452) (0.0597) (0.0638)
Product fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,494 29,494 29,474 29,493 29,494 29,543
Products  4,126  4,126  4,126  4,126  4,126  4,126
 R 2 0.020 0.018 0.011 0.009 0.080 0.009
Panel B. Results of 100 iterations of placebo sampling, number of estimates landing above, below, and within  
95 percent confidence interval around 0
Above 0 Below 0 Insignificant
Labor  2 2 96
Output  6 3 91
Capital  4 5 91
Wage  6 3 91
Q/L 12 5 83
Establishments  5 4 91
Panel C. Results of 100 iterations of placebo sampling for labor and output
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E. Net Impact of SSI Reservation Policies on District Outcomes
The analyses above show that  de-reservation increased employment among 
entrants to the newly  de-reserved product spaces as well as large incumbents that 
were previously constrained by the SSI limits. In contrast, employment among 
small incumbents fell. In this section, we aggregate results on the net impact of 
 de-reservation across entrants and incumbents in the product space as well as across 
different industries. We explore this net impact of  de-reservation on overall manu-
facturing employment using the  pretreatment allocation of reserved and  nonreserved 
products at the district level.
Our measure of exposure to  de-reservation is similar to that used by Topalova 
(2010) to study the impact of tariff liberalization on Indian districts. It exploits the 
fact that the  de-reservation policy was implemented at a national level and varied 
across products, but calculates each district’s exposure based on  beginning-of-period 
product mix. Therefore, it avoids any changes in a district’s product mix that may 
have been induced by the  de-reservation policy. At the same time, it uses geographic 
variation in exposure to  de-reservation, which is less likely to have influenced the 
special committee’s decisions than  product-level characteristics.
For each of the 339 districts in India that have at least 10 establishments reported 
in the ASI for each year in our sample, we construct a measure of exposure to 
 de-reservation as follows:
(6)  FrDeres dt  =  
 ∑ p ( Employment 2000 dp ×  Deres pt )     _________________________  Total Employment 2000 d   .
 FrDere s dt , the fraction of employment exposed to  de-reservation, is calculated 
as the sum over all products  p of employment associated with that product in dis-
trict  d in 2000, multiplied by a dummy variable indicating whether the product was 
 de-reserved, and divided by total  district-level employment in 2000. We allocate 
each establishment’s employment to its various products based on output shares.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows the fraction of employment in each district that was 
associated with reserved products in 2000. Panel B shows the extent to which prod-
ucts were subsequently  de-reserved by 2007, weighting each  de-reserved product by 
its labor share in 2000. The two figures illustrate the heterogeneity in coverage of 
product reservation across India. In 2000, prior to the bulk of the reforms, there was 
significant diversity in coverage across Indian districts. By 2007, the reforms had 
significantly affected all parts of India to varying degrees. This regional variation in 
intensity, based on  preexisting exposure, is what allows us to identify the employ-
ment effects of the reform.
We estimate the following  long-difference DID model at the district level:
(7)  Δ  y d  = βΔ  FrDeres d +  μ d .
The left-hand-side variable,  Δ  y d is alternatively the change in log of employ-
ment, output, capital, wages, or labor productivity between 2000 and 2007. The 
right-hand-side variable is the change in the fraction of employment exposed 
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Figure 4. Product Reservation and  De-Reservation by District
Notes: Panel A shows the fraction of employment in 2000 that was associated with manufacturing a product that 
was ever reserved, by district. Panel B shows the fraction of employment in 2000 that was associated with manu-
facturing a product that was eventually  de-reserved, by district.
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to  de-reservation between 2000 and 2007, where the fraction is calculated as 
described above. We calculate these variables at the district level by aggregating 
the  establishment-level variables, inflated by their sampling weights. One poten-
tial concern is that the  de-reservation may have resulted in  interdistrict migration, 
thus affecting  district-level results. To address this issue, we control for the average 
change in  de-reservation among neighboring districts. We also control for whether 
the district is located in a state with  employer-friendly regulations (as classified by 
Besley and Burgess 2004), and for a variety of  preexisting,  district-level character-
istics based on the 2001 census.
Table 8 shows the  district-level DID results. The point estimates show a positive 
relationship between  de-reservation and employment, output, capital and wages, 
and a negative relationship between  de-reservation and labor productivity. The 
results are statistically significant for both employment and output. In the data, the 
average change in the fraction of  de-reserved employment was 0.076. Thus, the 
point estimate from panel A, at 0.785, suggests a 6 percent increase in  district-level 
employment.
We note that the coefficient on  neighboring-district  de-reservation is negative 
for all variables and significant for both output and productivity. These results are 
consistent with the migration of workers and economic activity toward neighbor-
ing districts that experienced higher levels of  de-reservation. Additional specifica-
tions interact a dummy for  pro-employer with the fraction  de-reserved. While our 
main results are unaffected, we find that the employment creation associated with 
the SSI reform is driven by labor expansion in states that were not  pro-employer. 
Table 8—Impact of  De-Reservation on  District-Level Outcomes: Long Differences,  2000–2007
  Δ log(labor)   Δ log(output)   Δ log(capital)   Δ log(wage)   Δ log(Q/L)
 Δ fraction  de-reserved 0.785 0.741 0.649 0.160 −0.0439
(0.266) (0.323) (0.455) (0.132) (0.233)
 Δ fraction  de-reserved −0.462 −0.962 −0.794 −0.113 −0.500
 in neighboring districts (0.394) (0.433) (0.575) (0.173) (0.300)
 Pro-employer state −0.0384 −0.0889 0.220 0.0228 −0.0506
(0.0722) (0.0711) (0.0970) (0.0313) (0.0569)
Literacy (percent) −0.00524 −0.00298 −0.0116 0.000202 0.00226
(0.00358) (0.00341) (0.00595) (0.00173) (0.00286)
Scheduled caste/tribes (percent) 0.00117 −0.000701 −0.00229 0.00144 −0.00187
(0.00241) (0.00251) (0.00315) (0.00127) (0.00217)
Control labor force composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 339 339 339 339 339
R2 0.190 0.066 0.128 0.044 0.111
Notes: Results from  district-level regressions of changes in dependent variables (shown in column headings) from 
 2000–2007 on change in fraction of district employment in 2000 that was subsequently associated with product 
 de-reservation. Fraction  de-reserved is the fraction of a district’s employment in 2000 that is subsequently asso-
ciated with  de-reservation. Fraction  de-reserved in neighboring districts is the fraction of employment in contig-
uous districts in 2000 that is subsequently associated with  de-reservation. Q/L indicates labor productivity (real 
output divided by number of employees). All specifications include a dummy equal to 1 if the state was classified 
as  pro-employer at the end of the period studied by Besley and Burgess (2004). Specifications also control for the 
following characteristics from the 2001 census: the share of district’s population that is scheduled caste/tribe, the 
percentage of literate population, and the percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture, mining, man-
ufacturing, trade, transport, and services (construction is the omitted category). Regressions are weighted by ini-
tial labor shares, and use all districts that, after applying weights, have at least 10 establishments in each ASI year. 
Errors are  heteroskedasticity-robust.
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These additional results suggest that the SSI reservation policy was more binding in 
 pro-worker states.
To summarize, the removal of SSI reservations increased formal sector employ-
ment. At the same time, it is possible that the SSI policy reforms affected unor-
ganized, or informal, manufacturing as well. One possibility is that the reforms 
drove formal sector workers into informal sector jobs, which typically pay lower 
wages and provide fewer benefits. While panel data do not exist for the unor-
ganized sector, we used two rounds of the National Sample Survey Office’s 
Unorganized Manufacturing Enterprises Survey—from 2000 and 2005—to con-
duct a  district-level analysis. Table 9 shows the results of regressing the changes in 
unorganized sector employment, output, capital, and labor productivity, at the dis-
trict level, on the change in  de-reservation in the formal sector. We do not include 
wage as an outcome variable, as many unorganized establishments rely on unpaid 
family members.
There is no statistically significant association between the fraction of 
 de-reservation and  district-level employment in unorganized manufacturing. If any-
thing, the negative coefficient on unorganized employment in Table 9 and the posi-
tive coefficient in Table 8 suggest that  de-reservation may have been associated with 
a shift away from the unorganized sector toward organized sector employment.
III. Additional Robustness Checks
In this section, we document a number of additional checks to test the robustness 
of the results in various ways.
Product Switching—The positive coefficients on entrants may reflect the fact that 
establishments moving into these product spaces are a selected sample. Entrants 
focusing on core competencies may have been expected to grow even in the absence 
of the  de-reservation. To investigate this possibility, we include a dummy variable 
that equals one when an establishment changes its main product, regardless of 
whether the product is reserved, is  de-reserved, or was never reserved. Table 10 
shows that establishments that switch products do, in fact, appear to grow, suggest-
ing selection into switching. Nonetheless, the effects of the  de-reservation remain 
robust in magnitude and significance.
Table 9—Checking for Spillovers into Unorganized Manufacturing: Long Differences,  2000–2005
  Δ log(labor)   Δ log(output)   Δ log(capital)   Δ log(Q/L)
 Δ organized sector −0.608 0.505 −0.183 1.113
 manufacturing  de-reserved (0.451) (0.668) (0.697) (0.613)
Observations 401 401 401 401
 R2 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.013
Notes: Results from  district-level regressions of changes in dependent variables (shown in column headings) for the 
unorganized manufacturing sector from  2000–2005 on change in fraction of organized (ASI) sector district employ-
ment in 2000 that was subsequently associated with product  de-reservation. Q/L indicates labor productivity (real 
output divided by number of employees). Regressions are weighted by initial labor shares and use all districts that, 
after applying weights, have at least ten establishments in each year. Errors are  heteroskedasticity-robust.
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 Establishment-Specific Time Trends.—We might be concerned that our differen-
tial results for entrants and incumbents suggest that  de-reservation attracted entrants 
who were already growing quickly. Thus, we conducted a robustness check to con-
trol for  establishment-specific time trends. For each outcome of interest, we first 
conducted a separate regression, for each establishment, of the outcome on a time 
trend. We used the coefficient on the time trend to generate predicted values for 
that outcome of interest and for that establishment. We then combined all of the 
 establishment-specific predicted values for a particular outcome of interest into one 
variable (for example,  ln ( ̂  labor) and included this variable as a control in the rel-
evant regression (i.e., the regression for that outcome of interest; for example we 
included  ln ( ̂  labor) in the labor regressions,  ln ( ̂  output) in the output regressions, 
and so forth). When including the predicted variables as independent variables, we 
bootstrapped standard errors. Results, shown in online Appendix Table C.1, are very 
close to the baseline results.23
23 However, the number of observations is lower than in the baseline results as we can only include an 
 establishment-specific trend for establishments observed at least twice. 
Table 10—Impact of  De-Reservation on  Establishment-Level Outcomes,  
Controlling for Product Switching
log(labor) log(output) log(capital) log(wage) log(Q/L)
Panel A. Aggregate results
 t ≥ year  de-reserved −0.00568 0.0213 0.00579 0.0127 0.0149
(0.00861) (0.0120) (0.00992) (0.00485) (0.00974)
Switch 0.0608 0.0860 0.0252 0.0189 0.0426
(0.00306) (0.00459) (0.00371) (0.00196) (0.00389)
Establishment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 298,984 294,157 292,998 296,575 294,157
Establishments 130,397 128,033 127,822 128,986 128,033
 R2 0.008 0.013 0.003 0.026 0.008
Panel B. Incumbents versus entrants
Incumbent ×  t ≥ year  de-reserved −0.0205 −0.0180 −0.00974 0.00181 −0.0157
(0.00946) (0.0127) (0.0106) (0.00507) (0.0102)
Entrant ×  t ≥ year  de-reserved 0.0737 0.231 0.0893 0.0708 0.178
(0.0194) (0.0324) (0.0254) (0.0138) (0.0274)
Switch 0.0602 0.0846 0.0247 0.0185 0.0416
(0.00306) (0.00459) (0.00371) (0.00197) (0.00389)
Establishment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 298,984 294,157 292,998 296,575 294,157
Establishments 130,397 128,033 127,822 128,986 128,033
 R2 0.008 0.014 0.003 0.026 0.009
Notes: Results from  establishment-level regressions. Dependent variables are shown in column headings. 
“t  ≥ year  de-reserved” is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the product associated with the establishment 
is removed from the list of reserved products. Incumbent indicates that the establishment previously made the prod-
uct when it had reserved status. Entrant indicates that the establishment only made the product after it had been 
 de-reserved. Switch is a dummy that takes a value of 1 when an establishment changes the main product it makes. 
Q/L indicates labor productivity (real output divided by number of employees). Errors are clustered at the estab-
lishment level.
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 Product-Level Time Trends.—Another concern is that the timing of the 
 de-reservation policy coincides with  pre-de-reservation  product-specific growth 
rates. We address this concern in earlier sections by including an  event-time trend 
that varies by years relative to  de-reservation, and by performing explicit checks 
for  product-level  pretrends. An alternative approach is to include separate time 
trends for every product. We implement this robustness check in the same way as 
the  establishment-level trends above. For each product, we regress each outcome 
of interest on a time trend, using all establishments that produce that product. We 
then include the predicted values of the relevant outcome variable as a control in the 
 establishment-level regressions, bootstrapping standard errors to account for predic-
tion error. Results, shown in online Appendix Table C.2, are again very close to the 
baseline results.
Additional Controls.—We also test the robustness of our results to controlling for 
a variety of additional characteristics:  industry-by-year dummies (industry dummies 
at the  three-digit level); initial location dummies interacted with year dummies; ini-
tial age (dummies for five age groups) interacted with year dummies; the initial ratio 
of production to total workers (dummies for ten deciles) interacted with year dum-
mies; and the initial ratio of capital to number of workers (dummies for ten deciles) 
interacted with year dummies. Results are reported in online Appendix Table C.3 
and are similar to baseline findings.
Industry-Level Results.—This paper emphasizes establishment-, product-, and 
 district-level measures to evaluate the impact of  de-reservation. Conducting the 
analysis at the industry level is likely to be less accurate because only a handful of 
products were typically reserved in each industry. Nonetheless, to check for addi-
tional robustness to this level of analysis, we created an aggregate industry level 
measure of exposure to  de-reservation at time  t . Use of the sampling multipliers 
means that smaller establishments, which frequently make SSI products, are given 
greater weight in these regressions than they are in the  establishment-level results.
We use the sampling weights provided by the ASI to create a representative sample 
of establishments at the industry level. We measure industries at the  four-digit level; 
in the ASI there are 124 such industries. Assigning a single date for  de-reservation at 
the industry level is problematic because most industries have multiple  de-reserved 
products, many of which have different dates of  de-reservation. Instead we adopt an 
approach similar to that used in the  district-level regressions, following Topalova 
(2010). We calculate the exposure of each industry  j to  de-reservation at time  t 
as the sum over all products of revenue associated with each product  p in indus-
try  j in 2000, multiplied by a dummy variable indicating whether the product was 
 de-reserved, and divided by total product revenues in that industry in 2000:
(8)  FrDeres jt  =  
 ∑ p ( Revenue 2000 jp ×  Deres pt )    _________________________ Total Product Revenue 2000 j   .
Our  left-hand-side variables are contemporaneous measures of aggregate labor, 
output, capital, average wage (calculated as aggregate wage payments divided by 
aggregate labor), and aggregate number of establishments at the industry level. We 
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then estimate the effects of exposure to  de-reservation on each outcome of interest 
y as follows:
(9)  y jt  = β  FrDeres jt +  α j +  α t +  μ jt .
We also include a  long-difference specification, which uses the change in the 
fraction  de-reserved, and the changes in the outcomes of interest, between 2000 and 
2007:
(10)  Δ  y j  = βΔ  FrDeres j +  μ j . 
The results, reported in online Appendix Table C.4, demonstrate that  de-reservation 
is associated with a significant increase in total employment. The results in panel 
A from the annual fixed effect regressions indicate that if an industry were to go 
from fully reserved to fully  de-reserved, employment would increase by more than 
25 percent. The average fraction of  industry-level employment  de-reserved between 
2000 and 2007 was 20 percent. The point estimate from panel B, at 0.565, therefore 
represents an 11 percent increase in employment on average. Although the coeffi-
cient on output is also positive, it is not statistically different from zero, and the per-
centage increase is less than the percentage increase in employment. These findings 
are consistent with our  district-level results, which also show that  de-reservation is 
associated with increases in employment and output.
IV. SSI Policy and the  Size-Age-Growth Relationship
Our results show that eliminating product reservation for small establishments 
in India boosted aggregate employment growth. The literature on the relationship 
between establishment size, age, and growth has typically focused not on a specific 
policy change, but on the reduced-form relationship between these variables at a 
snapshot in time. A number of papers in this vein suggest that small firms grow faster, 
both in developed and developing countries (see, among others, Evans 1987a, b; 
Gunning and Mengistae 2001; Ayyagari,  Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2011; 
Neumark, Wall, and Zhang 2011).24 Recently, however, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and 
Miranda (2013) demonstrate that in the United States, after controlling for firm age, 
and accounting for regression to the mean and exit, small firms do not grow faster 
than large firms.
In this section we present the reduced-form relationship between establish-
ment size, age, and employment growth for manufacturing firms in India, making 
 corrections as in Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) for regression to the 
mean effects and for the fact that small establishments are more likely to exit than 
large establishments. We address the potential for regression to the mean by measur-
ing size as average size in periods  t and  t ′ :
(11)  
_
 S (t) = 0.5 [S(t )  + S( t ′ )] .
24 Li and Rama (2015) survey much of the literature on firm dynamics in developing countries, and conclude 
that including  micro-enterprises is critical for correctly identifying patterns of job creation and productivity growth. 
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Employment growth is measured as size in period  t ′ minus size in period  t , divided 
by average size and by the gap between the two periods:
(12)  ‾ Growth(t )  =  S( t ′ )  − S(t) ________
 
_
 S (t) [ t ′ − t]  .
Another challenge in estimating the relationship between size and growth arises 
because of sample selection. Small establishments tend to have higher failure rates 
than large establishments. These higher failure rates mean that if only continu-
ing establishments are included in estimates of the  size-growth relationship, then 
the estimated growth rate of small establishments is likely to be biased upward. 
Examining only continuing establishments also fails to account for growth due to 
entry, which may bias the growth rate of small establishments downward. To over-
come these challenges, we replicate the Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) 
measure of growth, which allows for both entry and exit.
To exclude any potential effects of the SSI policy, we exclude all establishments 
that were affected by the SSI policies, either as incumbents or as entrants into 
reserved products. The exercise provides a robustness check on the previous section, 
ties our results to the existing literature, and casts light on the long-run relationship 
between employment growth and establishment size and age.
The results are summarized in Figure 5. The figure shows projected employment 
growth rates for each size and age class across Indian establishments that were never 
affected by  small-scale reservation. Each bar represents projected growth by size 
and age class, controlling for a number of other characteristics.
The results are remarkably consistent with the findings of Haltiwanger, Jarmin, 
and Miranda (2013) for the United States, and with our findings of the impact of 
dismantling the SSI reservation policy. Taking into account the high failure rate 
of smaller establishments, the establishments with the fastest labor growth are 
either young or big. Average employment growth is positive and high for nearly 
all establishments with at least 500 employees. Employment growth is also pos-
itive for nearly all size classes of establishments between 1 and 2 years of age. 
Controlling for age, the largest establishments experienced the highest employment 
growth. Controlling for size, the youngest establishments also experienced the high-
est employment growth.
V. Concluding Comments
In this paper, we use the elimination of a policy that promoted small and medium 
establishments in India to answer the following question: which kinds of estab-
lishments create more employment? For the past 60 years, India has promoted 
 small-scale industry (SSI) by reserving production of some goods for smaller 
establishments. During the sample period, one in four establishments in the Annual 
Survey of Industries was covered by this policy.25 The stated goal of  small-scale 
25 Since large establishments are  over-represented in the sample, and the reservation policy was targeted at 
small establishments, it is likely that an even greater share of the overall population of formal establishments was 
covered by the policy. 
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reservation was to promote employment growth and income redistribution, but some 
commentators have argued that the policy constrained growth. We use the elimina-
tion of the SSI reservation policy between 1997 and 2007 as an exogenous shock to 
understand size and employment linkages over time.
Our results suggest that eliminating incentives for small establishments boosted 
aggregate employment growth. India eliminated all but a handful of product restric-
tions protecting small and medium establishments from competition over a short 
horizon between 1997 and 2007. This period was characterized by few other reforms, 
as most of the trade liberalization and dismantling of the License Raj had been done 
in previous decades. The elimination of  small-scale reservation over a short horizon 
allows us to measure the importance of size in employment promotion.
We find that districts that were more exposed to elimination of the reservations 
for SMEs experienced higher employment growth between 2000 and 2007. The 
magnitude of the effect is large: between 2000 and 2007 a district facing the average 
amount of  de-reservation would have experienced a 6 percent increase in overall 
employment.
To explore the mechanisms that led to net employment growth, we examine the 
effects of the  de-reservation policy at the establishment level. Reserving products for 
SMEs was intended to protect employment in small establishments. We find that elim-
inating this policy decreased employment among smaller, older establishments. Critics 
Figure 5. Projected Employment Growth by Size and Age
Notes: Projected establishment employment growth rates for each size and age class. Size is measured as average 
employment between the previous period observed and the current period. Employment growth is measured as 
described in the text. Growth measure accounts for both entry and exit.
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of the policy suggested that product reservation was holding back the growth of larger 
establishments. Consistent with their claims, we find that the entry and expansion of 
output, employment, and investment were driven by new entrants to the previously 
reserved product space as well as establishments that were previously constrained 
from expanding their existing stock of fixed assets. We also document increased 
investment in plant and machinery among these previously constrained incumbents. 
Our findings can be interpreted through the lens of the heterogeneous firms litera-
ture (Melitz 2003); as  de-reservation increases competition in a product market, large 
establishments increase their market shares at the expense of small establishments.
How well did the reservation policy achieve its goals? While  small-scale reser-
vation may have protected employment in certain small establishments, it did so at 
the expense of employment elsewhere. With respect to the goal of income enhance-
ment, our results show that eliminating reservation policies for smaller establish-
ments increased average wages. However, it is not clear whether this effect is due 
to entrants paying higher wages to existing workers, or to a shift toward a  higher 
skilled workforce. Our analysis suggests that the removal of  small-scale reserva-
tions increased overall employment by encouraging the growth of younger, larger 
establishments—those that are most likely to pay higher wages, create more invest-
ment, be more productive, and generate growth in employment.
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